I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, there is an ongoing and concerning public health problem: the large number of unintended pregnancies. Over one-half of the 6.6 million annual pregnancies in the United States are unintended. 1 According to some estimates, a woman in the United States should expect to have 1.42 unintended pregnancies by age forty-five. 2 The United States unintended pregnancy rate is considerably higher than the comparable rate in many other developed, first world countries. 3 While it is true that two-thirds of women in the United States are on some form of contraception, 4 almost half of all unintended pregnancies result from women who use their contraception inconsistently or incorrectly. 5 The remaining fifty-four percent of unintended pregnancies are a result of women who continue to abstain from any contraceptive method at all. 6 The unintended pregnancy rate is particularly concerning given that childbirths that result from unintended or closely spaced pregnancies are correlated with negative outcomes for the parent and child. 7 For example, research has shown that, compared to women who become pregnant intentionally, "women who experience unintended pregnancies have a higher incidence of mental-health problems, have less stabled romantic relationships, experience higher rates of physical abuse, and are more likely to have abortions or to delay the initiation of prenatal care." 8 Similarly, children resulting from unintended pregnancies are at risk of experiencing negative physical and mental health issues, and "are more likely to drop out of high school and to engage in delinquent behavior during their teenage years." 9 This paper proceeds in four parts. Part II of this paper details the unintended pregnancy crisis and explains how it can be attributed to dissatisfaction with existing contraceptive products. Part III offers an overview of the past forty years of product liability lawsuits for contraceptive products, and argues that the threat of liability is the reason for the lack of innovation of new, cutting edge contraceptive products. Part IV then explores, in depth, the theories proffered by advocates of federal preemption, ultimately concluding that it is a poor solution and an unnecessarily broad approach to the growing crisis. Having established the fundamental issues and misunderstandings, Part V argues that the most plausible solution to the unintended pregnancy crisis is a no-fault compensation plan for those injured by contraceptive products. Additionally, this Article argues that such a scheme could be modeled around the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA), 10 which has proven to be successful at insulating manufacturers from unpredictable liability 11 as well as stimulating research into cutting edge products. 12 Most importantly, NCVIA has been shown to be extremely effective in offering injured consumers an equitable form of compensation. 13
II. THE UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS

A. DISSATISFACTION WITH EXISTING CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS
The Guttmacher Institute has found that the most widely reported reason for contraceptive nonuse or misuse includes dissatisfaction with available contraceptive methods and concerns about side effects of alternatives. 14 For example, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) has found that nearly thirty percent of all users stop using the pill due to side effects that include "nausea, weight gain, sore or swollen breasts, spotting and mood changes." 15 In 2010, a study conducted by the Journal of Family Practice determined that only fifty-seven percent of women on the pill were happy with it. 16 In fact, studies still show that even the use of lower dose hormonal contraceptive pills subjects the user to high risks of depression and decreases in libido. 17 Most other methods of contraception have discontinuation rates of almost fifty percent after one year of use. 18 A more recent report published by the CDC has found that nearly half the women surveyed had discontinued some form of contraception because they disliked it or were concerned about its side effects, and almost one-third of all women tried five or more types of birth control. 19 Despite the fact that women consistently express dissatisfaction with existing contraception methods, the availability of cutting-edge contraceptive methods remains stagnant. 20 To be clear, there have been important advances since the advent of the pill; developments such as contraceptive implants, patches, and vaginal rings have all attempted to meet the diverse needs of women throughout their reproductive lives. 21 However, these items have predominantly been variations of preexisting technologies, such as variants of hormone dosage levels and delivery methods as opposed to any significant technological breakthrough. 22 Indeed, a close examination of the contraceptive landscape reveals that all birth control continues to fit into the following four categories: barrier method, hormonal method, natural method, and permanent method. 23 
B. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INTO ALTERNATIVES REMAIN STAGNANT
It should not come as a surprise that technological developments in the contraceptive arena is moribundinvestment in this field is at an all-time low. 25 Commercial investment for research of new contraceptive methods accounted for only $33 million in 2013. 26 Pharmaceutical companies are simply not interested in developing contraceptive products. For example, a survey conducted by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), has indicated that, for 371 female-specific new drugs on the market, only ten were contraceptives; there were, however, "71 new drugs for women's cancers, 55 for arthritis, 45 for autoimmune diseases, 41 for diabetes, and 31 for psychiatric conditions." 27 Since, generally speaking, new drug discovery and development is led by the private sector, it is troubling that most large pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have largely abandoned the field of contraceptive research and development. 28 This extreme lull in contraceptive research exists despite clear indications that women are desperately searching for alternative options. 29 For example, a recent study indicated that women would enjoy the option to take the "Pericoital" contraceptive, a discreet alternative to an everyday pill. 30 In effect, Pericoital would allow women a safe option to take a NAT'L INST. OF contraceptive before or after sex rather than on an everyday basis. 31 However, as of yet, Pericoital has not been brought to market in the United States. 32 Similarly, movement on a contraceptive gel that women could rub on their arm or leg has been slow, despite reports that the drug could be a revolutionary, and almost side effect-less alternative to the birth control pill. 33 Multipurpose prevention technologies, which would simultaneously protect against pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases have also been slow to come to market. 34 Finally, while there has been talk for over thirty years about a male contraceptive, none have yet been brought to market in the United States. 35 Commentators have suggested that this lack of contraceptive research development is not a result of any demandbased deficiency. 36
III. CONTRACEPTIVES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
It has been argued that threat of liability is the primary reason for private sector abandonment of the field of contraceptive research and development. 37 Pharmaceutical companies, driven largely by profit, are simply responding to the legitimate threat of large-scale lawsuits. Given the tremendous risk of liability, and the associated damaging publicity, investments in contraceptive 31 products are simply no longer profitable. 38 The history is clear: in the past sixty-five years since the "pill" has been introduced, 39 the contraceptive arena has been plagued by successive, highly publicized product liability lawsuits. 40 The increase in product liability suits also closely corresponds to the rapid departure from the contraceptive market by drug and device manufacturers. For example, prior to the 1970s and 1980s, the United States led the world in contraceptive development. 41 However, today, there are only a few American manufacturers that continue to research and develop contraceptive products. 42 Any person who continues to believe that liability concerns are not heavily influencing pharmaceutical company business decisions should consider the examples below.
A. THE PILL
The pill is arguably the most socially and economically significant invention of the twentieth century. Introduced in the United States in 1960 by G.D. Searle & Co. as nearly 100-percent effective, "Envoid" quickly gained recognition as the most reliable way for women to control their own fertility. 43 However, almost immediately following the oral contraceptive's release, women began to report serious side effects including strokes, blood clots, cancers, birth defects, aneurysms, and heart attacks. 44 Gynecologists, who were often not informed or were simply unaware of the side effects of the pill, frequently dismissed their patients' complaints as exaggerations. 45 Others made the unilateral decision to not advise their patients as to the side effects of the pill, based on the common belief that "women, being very 'emotional,' might overreact. Not wanting to unduly alarm 38 women, doctors took the decision out of their patients' hands." 46 It was not long before the product liability suits began to enter the courts. The first case that considered alleged defects in the Envoid pill was that of Simonait v. Searle. 47 There, the plaintiff alleged failure to warn and breach of implied warranty after she contracted thrombophlebitis, a blood clot disorder. 48 Following a lengthy jury trial, which included the expert testimony by G.D. Searle's lead investigatory doctors, the jury returned a verdict for the defense. 49 Another early case, Black v. Searle, 50 involved G.D. Searle's Envoid. The lawsuit was brought to trial in 1969 and involved a twenty-nine-year-old woman who died from a pulmonary embolism. 51 While the plaintiffs were able to show that, at the time of the woman's death, there were more than 600 reports of thromboembolic phenomena, they still encountered serious problems with respect to proving causation. 52 Ultimately, the jury again found for the defendant, but this time added a recommendation to their verdict, suggesting that G.D. Searle add more intensive warnings to their product. 53 Motivated by the overwhelming reports from injured women, Barbara Seaman, a leading activist and journalist for the women's health movement, authored a book in 1969 that described the crisis and the urgent need for safer alternatives. 54 In her book, Seaman included testimony from world renowned physicians and researchers who questioned the safety of the pill. 55 The book, along with calls from similar activists, 56 United States Senate to hold hearings in January 1970 to address the widespread adverse events. 57 Almost immediately after the hearings, hormone levels in the pill were decreased to a small fraction of what they were originally. 58 Despite the lower doses, product liability lawsuits continued through the 1970s and 1980s, but saw limited success as the pills became safer and the warnings more comprehensive. 59
B. DALKON SHIELD
The Dalkon Shield, invented in 1968, was a device that was inserted into a woman's uterus that prevented the implantation of a fertilized egg. 60 The intrauterine device, commonly known as the "IUD," was engineered with spikes along its edges to prevent instances of natural expulsion from the body. 61 The IUD also contained a string that passed from the uterus into the vagina. 62 Based upon an impressive, year-long study in which the device purportedly achieved a 98.9-percent success rate, 63 the device was picked up by the A.H Robins Company in 1970. 64 From the device's inception, doctors, scientists, and sources within the company advised that the product could potentially cause pelvic infections, septic abortions, and higher-than-reported pregnancy rates. 65 marketed the product to the public as "[t]he modern superior I.U.D.
[providing] safe, sure, sensible contraception." 66 By 1973, over three million women were using the new contraceptive product. 67 Almost immediately, women began reporting adverse effects associated with the shield, including pain and bleeding, uterus perforation, and infections that led to miscarriages, stillbirths, and death. 68 Once again, A.H. Robins Company became aware of the reports, but did little to warn doctors about the risks. 69 The company also failed to investigate the reports. 70 Finally, in 1974, the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, along with the FDA, pressured A.H. Robins Company to suspend the manufacture and sale of the Dalkon Shield in the United States until the product's dangers could be more thoroughly investigated. 71 However, it was not until 1980 that the company sent letters to women, urging that they have their Dalkon Shields removed, and telling them that A.H. Robins Company would cover all associated expenses. 72 The first wave of lawsuits against A.H. Robins Company commenced in 1974. 73 Known for insinuating that the injured woman's hygiene and sexual misconduct was the impetus for the injury, A.H. Robins Company won a number of successive defense verdicts. 74 In fact, in the 1970s, the company was only required to pay out an average of $11,000 per claim. 75 However, in 1983, the tide turned for plaintiffs when the small firm handling a 66. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195-96 (Colo. 1984 (1984) ("Robins took the Dalkon Shield off the market in 1974 and, in 1980, mailed a letter to 200,000 physicians and government agencies recommending the removal of the device from any women still using it. But the product has never been recalled, and critics of the shield believe an untold number of women are still wearing it today."). 74. See Mokhiber, supra note 65, at 3-4 ("At trial, the company has, in some instances, sought to defend itself by shifting the blame to the victims. A.H. Robins' attorneys have argued that frequent sexual intercourse with multiple partners could cause injuries currently being blamed on the shield.").
75. See Law, supra note 60, at 366. majority of the cases was forced to pass the cases to a large and experienced Minneapolis-based firm Robins, Zelle, Larson and Kaplan. 76 Led by high-powered attorneys, Dale Larson and Michael Ciresi, the plaintiffs managed to consolidate a number of their cases and secured successive multi-million dollar verdicts based on defective design and willful negligence claims. 77 News of Ciresi's and Larson's victories soon emboldened other plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue Dalkon Shield cases. 78 Faced with billions of dollars in liability exposure and damaging press, A.H. Robins Company filed for bankruptcy in 1986. 79 Kirsten Thompson, researcher at the University of California, San Francisco, noted the effect that A.H. Robins Company's bankruptcy had on the industry: "The idea that a company could go bankrupt because of a contraceptive product was pretty horrifying." 80 Indeed, Dalkon Shield litigation and the resulting bankruptcy cast a shadow over IUD development for the past thirty years. 81 From 1983 to 1988, not a single IUD was marketed in the United States, as the horror stories still lingered in women's consciences. 82 In 1988, a newer type of IUD, "Paragarud," was introduced but achieved limited success. 83 It took another eleven years until "Mirena," a modern version of the hormonal IUD was developed. 84 Mirena has seen more success than previous IUDs, 85 but manufacturers, still tentative about future liability, have consistently charged astronomical prices for these devices at approximately $500 to $800 per device. Moreover, thirty-percent of health providers continue to be unconvinced of the safety of IUDs for women who have never given birth. 87 This is despite the fact that the newest IUD devices have proven to be extraordinarily safe and are no endorsed by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 88
C. NORPLANT
Norplant was the first implant contraceptive marketed in the United States. 89 The drug consisted of six hormone-releasing, silicone coated rods implanted under the skin in the arm. 90 The drug was essentially a new delivery method for levonorgestrel, a manufactured hormone previously used in the pill forms of birth control. 91 The drug, which cost upwards of $114 million to develop, 92 boasted an effectiveness period of five years. 93 First introduced by the New York based non-profit, "Population Council," 94 and eventually brought to market by Wyeth-Ayerst in 1991, 95 Norplant became one of the most popular contraceptives in the United States. 96 As of 1995, nearly one million United States women, and 2.5 million women worldwide, used the Norplant device. 97 introduced to the market. 98 Additionally, Norplant was much more straightforward with respect to listing potential side effects in its marketing campaign than was Dalkon Shield. 99 Inspired by the large verdicts in the Dalkon Shield lawsuits of the 1980s, 100 plaintiffs attorneys boasted thousands of claimants that complained of "the now-discredited shifting constellation of symptoms . . . [of] . . . an ill-defined array of autoimmune disorders." 101 Initially attributed to the silicone casting on the implant, 102 and eventually to the hormones within the implant itself, 103 symptoms were almost always reversible and dissipated once the device was removed from the patient. 104 Despite the comparatively benign nature of the product and the comprehensiveness of the warnings on the device, 105 there were soon several class action suits pending against the manufacturer of Norplant. 106 By 1995, as many as 50,000 women alleged serious personal injury lawsuits against the manufacturer, with the claims being consolidated in federal court. 107 Finally negotiations, 109 the Norplant device was simply unable to recover from the negative publicity. 110 Such publicity caused sales of the drug to plunge dramatically, from 800 units per day in 1993, to sixty units per day in 1995. 111 Sadly, Norplant has since been shown to be one of the most highly efficacious contraceptives ever marketed, with failure rates just under one-percent. 112 Most significantly, it has been shown that some of the worst side effects tend to peter out by the end of the first year of use. 113 great promise in preventing pregnancy and having convenient offlabel uses, including the treatment of hormone-related acne. 119 By 2009, however, the love affair with the new blend was over, with these "fourth generation" contraceptive pills becoming involved in high-profile product liability lawsuits. 120 Otherwise healthy patients were dying or sustained injuries from pulmonary embolisms, deep vein thrombosis, and other blood clothing conditions. 121 As of April 2014, Bayer had negotiated Yaz and Yasmin lawsuit settlements with about 8,560 claimants in the United States. 122 To date, Bayer has paid $2 billion to settle Yasmin and Yaz litigation. 123 The German pharmaceutical giant is also facing a new wave of lawsuits concerning complications caused by its "Mirena" IUS birth control devices and its "Essure" permanent birth control devices. 124 Mirena is the first IUD marketed since Dalkon Shield, 125 and has been the subject of large-scale lawsuits over allegations that its warning label inadequately cautioned against the risk of side effects such as uterine perforation and migration. 126 on the other hand, involves the insertion of two metal coils inside the fallopian tube and is meant to instigate a natural tissue inflammation response to block sperm. 129 Litigation on Essure has just started to get off the ground, with the first lawsuit being filed in 2014. 130 While the precise implications of the Mirena and Essure litigation is still unclear, these lawsuits suggest that Bayer will approach with caution its investments in additional cutting-edge products.
IV. THE RISE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The mass tort litigation that has plagued the pharmaceutical and medical device industry over the past thirty years has spurred greater interest from commentators, scholars, and politicians in offering manufacturers immunity from product liability lawsuits. 131 In support of immunity, legal commentators and defense attorneys have pointed to the strong basis "that product liability has been a major factor in discouraging efforts to develop new contraceptives." 132 Simply speaking, the threat of liability and subsequent negative publicity has lessened the economic incentives to become involved in "high risk" medical products. Over the past ten years, supporters of immunity have successfully advocated for judicial recognition of the affirmative defense of federal preemption to shield manufacturers from burdensome liability. 
A. FEDERAL IMPOSSIBILITY PREEMPTION
The doctrine of preemption originates from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which states that federal law "shall be the supreme law of the land. . . . [A]ny Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 134 The Supreme Court has since recognized that State laws that conflict with federal law are "without effect." 135 There are two ways that a federal law and a state law can "conflict," either expressly or impliedly. 136 The doctrine of "express preemption" is self-explanatory, applied when federal legislation or regulation includes language expressly preempting state law. 137 Implied preemption is applied in three scenarios: (1) "where state law creates an obstacle for compliance with federal law"; (2) where federal law "occupies an entire field so as to create an 'inference of federal exclusivity'"; or (3) "where it is impossible for one to comply with both federal and state law." 138 Over the past six years, pharmaceutical companies have been arguing in favor of the third option, also known as "impossibility preemption." 139 As this argument goes, it is impossible to comply with state law tort standards while simultaneously complying with its duties under the federal, Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 140 Therefore, companies argue that state law tort standards should be preempted and plaintiffs should be barred from bringing state tort lawsuits relating to the drug or device in made against manufacturers of generic drugs."). 
B. PHARMACEUTICAL PREEMPTION
The FDCA requires FDA approval for a new drug through its "New Drug Approval" (NDA) process. 142 Understanding that the NDA process is often prohibitively expensive, and recognizing the need to stimulate the market for generic drugs, Congress eventually implemented the less-arduous Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) approval process. 143 The ANDA approval process, which is meant to be a less demanding standard than the NDA, only requires that a generic manufacturer show that the drug it seeks to have approved is bioequivalent to an already approved NDA-approved drug. 144 Additionally, the generic manufacturer applying for ANDA approval must ensure that the generic drug's label always matches its brand-name counterpart. 145 Any dissimilarity between the two labels will cause the generic drug's ANDA application to be denied. 146 These requirements have been dubbed as the "duty of sameness." 147 Over the past six years, large generic manufactures have successfully argued that they were unable to comply with state law tort standards because of the ANDA regulations that require "sameness" in bio-content and warnings of the generic and brand name drug. 144. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2013); see also Kelly, supra note 143, at 417 ("Instead of having to submit lengthy preclinical and clinical data demonstrating the drug's safety and efficacy to FDA, like that required in an innovator's New Drug Application ('NDA'), the only scientific data that a generic manufacturer must submit to FDA is data that the drug is 'bioequivalent' to the pioneer drug.").
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2012). Certain exceptions to this requirement may
apply. 151 the Supreme Court applied the same reasoning to preempt design defect claims made against the manufacturer of the generic drug, Clinoril. 152 Relying heavily upon the reasoning in Mensing, the Court ruled that New Hampshire's common law duty to ensure that a product's design is adequate was preempted by the federal law that forbids a generic manufacturer from making any unilateral changes to a drug's design that would cause it to differ from the brand name. 153 Recently, courts have begun to extend the reasoning in Mensing and Bartlett beyond claims against generic manufacturers to apply to brand name manufacturers. 154 For example, in 2015, in Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 155 the Sixth Circuit became the first appellate authority to extend the Bartlett design-defect preemption rationale to a brand name drug. 156 In Yates, a woman suffered a severe stroke one week after beginning the Ortho Evra contraceptive patch. 157 The court ruled that, because the pharmaceutical company could not make major, unilateral changes to the composition of a drug post-approval, it was impossible for the company to comply with the New York tort standards relating to defectively designed products. 158 James Beck, leading medical device and pharmaceutical product liability scholar, has tallied five other lower-court decisions that have applied impossibility preemption to brand name drug productsa notable shift in the preemption landscape to an even more 
21 U.S.C. § § 355(d)(7), (j)(2)(A)(i) (2012
C. MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION
Like pharmaceutical products, certain classes of medical devices are required to undergo significant FDA testing before approval. 160 And, also like pharmaceutical products, courts have authoritatively construed the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA to preempt any claims made against certain classes of medical device products. 161 For example, in 2008, in Riegel v. Medtronic, 162 the Supreme Court denied a design defect claim made against a device manufacturer on the grounds that state law claims were expressly preempted by the MDA. 163 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, was rather forthright with respect to the growing skepticism of excessive liability for medical device and drug manufacturers when he stated that tort liability under negligence or strict liability is "less deserving of preservation" in the face of federal regulations. 164 Many scholars have attributed this skepticism to preemption's rise and have noted that "[e]ven when courts are using the language of preemption doctrine, they may to some extent be seeking to reform products liability litigation." 165 Interestingly, there has been a recent push to apply impossibility preemption to 510(k) approved products by utilizing the same theories developed in Mensing. 166 The 510(k) approval is the medical device equivalent to the generic drug, ANDA 159. See Beck, supra note 154 ("Just last month we collected all the favorable precedent applying impossibility preemption under [Bartlett] to innovator drugsalthough the precise subject of that post was preemption of design defect claims involving § 510(k) medical devices. We were aware of four such rulings, all in the last year or so: [ approval process. 167 510(k) products have not traditionally been subject to the protections offered by the MDA express preemption. 168 As a result, this category of devices has been the prime target of a litany of state tort law claims over the past five years. 169 James Beck touches on these recent developments in a recent article, arguing that the 510(k) "substantial equivalence" process is amenable to a "duty of sameness" type of argument as used in the Mensing and Bartlett decisions. 170 While no known cases have yet to utilize such an argument, we should expect to see defendants test the boundaries of the MDA's precise preemptive scope.
D. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IS A POOR SOLUTION TO THE GROWING CRISIS
Despite data suggesting that manufacturers may respond positively to a decrease in potential liability, 171 federal preemption is an unnecessarily broad, and draconian approach, with concerning implications for those injured by medical and pharmaceutical products. 172 Under a federal preemption regime, all users of medical and pharmaceutical products are barred from bringing any claims under either strict liability or negligence theories. 173 This problem is particularly troublesome for women, who have historically suffered more severe, physically grotesque and personal injures than the typical consumer, and are now at an even greater risk of being barred from any form of compensation. 174 This is especially true for low-income women, who are more likely to opt for the generic substitute of any oral contraceptive product-liability for which has already been 167 foreclosed by the holdings in Mensing and Bartlett. 175 Federal preemption may even contribute to a decrease in the use of contraceptive products, and, thus, to an increase in the unwanted pregnancy rate. 176 Women, who will have inevitably heard of the succession of contraceptive failures and injuries, will also be aware that they are now at risk for a lack of compensation should they be injured. These women will increasingly turn to more benign, and less effective, modes of birth control. 177 Similarly, doctors will turn to prescribing lower risk, and less effective, contraceptive products to insulate themselves from potential liability arising from the use of contraceptive products. 178 In this sense, federal preemption will also have a cooling effect on the market for contraceptive products that offsets any benefits that might be achieved through insulation of liability.
Most importantly, proponents of federal preemption place too much faith upon the FDA regulatory process in ensuring that a product is dispenses at its maximum safety levels. 179 The threat of liability has been determined to be one of the most significant motivators in ensuring that manufacturers engage in thorough pre-and post-market testing of their products. 180 Indeed, the FDA sets only a minimum threshold of safety and does not require or encourage vigorous aftermarket studies. 181 Furthermore, pre- marketing clinical trials are necessarily limited, as they cannot take into account all the long-term effects of a drug at the time of approval. 182 As Justice Sotomayor aptly noted in her dissent in Mensing, "'[s]tate tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.' Thus, we recognized, 'state law offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation.'" 183 Lastly, judicial recognition of federal impossibility preemption as a viable affirmative defense in the pharmaceutical and medical device arena will contribute to a volatile, and unpredictable, preemption regime.
A judicially-originated process of reform is an unavoidably haphazard, inconsistent process as jurisdictions begin to implement the general rule of law.
Recently, in Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson, 184 the Massachusetts Supreme Court exemplified this phenomenon when they refused to comply with over six years worth of federal case law precedent, holding that a claim against a drug manufacturer was not preempted because the defendant failed to show that the FDA did not approve a change in a drug's label. 185 As Reckis demonstrates, judicial standards will necessarily become increasingly dissimilar and muddled as more jurisdictions increasingly grapple with federal preemption principles. 186
V. NO-FAULT FIX TO THE CONTRACEPTIVE AND UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS
In light of the decreased research and development of contraceptive products, as well as the misguided application of federal preemption in response to such issues, 187 lawmakers should be urged to investigate alternatives to the existing state law compensation schemes for injured consumers of contraceptive products. The most plausible alternative to the existing scheme is a no-fault compensation plan for those injured by contraceptive products. Such a scheme could be modeled around the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA). 188
A. THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT OF 1986
The NCVIA 189 was passed in response to shortages of vaccines in the 1970s and 1980s. 190 Such shortages were a direct result of product liability lawsuits brought by consumers gravely injured by vaccine products. 191 These lawsuits generated a greater perceived risk of exposure to vaccine manufacturers and caused them to effectively vacate the industry. 192 The Act, intended to relieve much of the liability burden on manufacturers of these products, 193 instituted a no-fault compensation plan for those injured by vaccines and related products. 194 The Act authorizes the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) to issue pre-determined awards contingent upon a number of factors, including whether an alleged injury has is found to be "vaccine related." 195 However, no inquiry is made into whether the manufacturer had breached any duty of safety, and as such, it is truly a "strict liability" process. 196 Although those plaintiffs who disagree with the award can petition for redress of their claims in federal court under statelaw product liability standards, 197 they are explicitly barred from bringing design defect and failure-to-warn claims, as well as from receiving punitive damages absent "fraud," "intentional and wrongful withholding of information," or "other criminal or illegal activity." 198 The program is intended to be self-funded, and is financed by a seventy-five-cent excise tax on each sale of a vaccine. 199 A claimant may recover lifelong medical expenses, lost earnings, attorney fees and up to $250,000 for pain and suffering. 200
B. SUCCESS OF THE NCVIA
The NCVIA has proven to be successful at insulating manufacturers from volatile and unpredictable liability from defective products. 201 This is evidenced by a number of manufacturers returning to the vaccine market after the passage of the act, and the development new and useful products. 202 Indeed, only four years after passage of the act, 203 the New York Times noted "a major revival in vaccine research by private pharmaceutical companies." 204 In the 1990s, the revival was even more dramatic-prices of vaccines had decreased dramatically, and more people were getting vaccinated than at any other time in history. 205 Most importantly, manufacturers have developed many vaccines that did not exist before the crisis, 206 and have also improved significantly on existing vaccines. 207 For example, in 1986, children were immunized against seven diseases. 208 Today, children are regularly immunized against eight additional diseases: haemophilus influenza type B, hepatitis A, hepatitis, B, influenza, meningococcal disease, pneumococcal disease, rotavirus, and varicella. 209 Another notable example includes the recently developed HPV vaccine, 210 which, in 2014, was FDA approved for administration to protect against nine strains of HPV, a cancer-causing virus. 211 Other vaccines developed since the initiation of the Act now protect against two types of viruses that cause seventy-percent of cervical cancers. 212 Drug manufacturers are also rushing to develop new, geneticallyengineered vaccines for diseases such as HIV, heroine addiction, cocaine addiction, and gonorrhea. 213 And, while cancer vaccines have been pursued for years, dozens of potential vaccines are finally in the late stages of clinical trials. 214 Fascinating new techniques and delivery method have also been developed since the initiation of the Act. 215 For decades, vaccines have strictly depended upon the "attenuation" technique, which relies on weakened or killed viruses to provoke an immune response. 216 However, since the Vaccine Act, new and other cutting-edge techniques have been employed with high degrees of success. 217 The first recombinant vaccine was licensed and approved in 1986 for use in the United States, first offering an effective method at preventing the Hepatitis B virus. 218 Today, much of the new research depends on the "live recombinant vaccine" technique, which utilizes attenuated viruses or bacterial strains as delivery devices for genes intended to provoke an immune response. 219 This technique has been touted as the most promising for development of an HIV vaccine. 220 Another technique that shows great promise is the "DNA Vaccine," which involves the injection of the DNA coding for an antigen directly into the muscle. 221 This technique has been noted as a potentially potent weapon against diseases such as malaria. 222
C. NCVIA AS A MODEL FOR THE CONTRACEPTIVE CRISIS
The staggering costs of unwanted pregnancies, the increased dissatisfaction with existing contraceptive methods, and the lack of innovation in contraceptive products indicates a clear need for immediate congressional action. 223 Given the tremendous growth and diversification of the vaccine industry following the passing of the NCVIA, it is suggested that an identical, no-fault approach be adopted for contraceptive products marketed in the United States. 224 A no-fault system based on the NCVIA would strike an ideal balance of product safety and product innovation. With threat of liability under the no-fault act, as well as through state law tort remedies, if a claimant is not satisfied with his no-fault act award, device manufacturers will still be motivated to prevent injury. However, the no-fault system will not impose excessive liability upon manufacturers, as it will disallow punitive damages against manufacturers except in situations involving criminal conduct, fraud, or non-compliance with the FDCA. 225 With each manufacturer being required to "pay into" the system on a per-contraceptive-sold basis, 226 device manufacturers will better be able to predict costs associated with producing a contraceptive product.
No longer will contraceptive manufacturing executives be leery of huge Dalkon-like awards, or Norplant-like publicity. 227 The claims will be quietly and efficiently settled through the no-fault program, offering adequate compensation for women injured by contraceptive products and, at the same time, avoiding huge windfalls for plaintiffs' attorneys. It is conceded that significant questions remain in determining the precise dollar amount of the tax per contraceptive that manufacturers would be required to pay out. It is also conceded that this amount would necessarily require constant modifications as dangers of particular products become more known and widespread. However, the scheme clearly offers a significantly more balanced approach than what is currently in place.
Of course, many women who have suffered non-economic damages exceeding the $250,000 cap may appear to be ill-served by the scheme. 228 However, these claimants will still have the ability to pursue strict liability and negligence causes of action against a manufacturer should they be dissatisfied with their nofault award. 229 Moreover, like the NCVIA, a no-fault program for contraceptive products would relieve a claimant from much of their burden of proving causation. 230 This is because claimants would only be require to show by a preponderance of the evidence an injury suffered that is listed on a pre-determined table. 231 Most critically, women's interest as a whole will increasingly be advanced as research and development into newer and safer 227. See discussion supra, Part III (discussing the tremendous impact Norplant publicity and Dalkon Shield jury awards had upon the profitability of those devices).
228. This problem is particularly troubling given that women have traditionally suffered more grotesque and life-altering injuries as a result of defective products. A contraceptive device is likely to cause similar catastrophic injuries that far exceed the mandated cap. See generally Koenig & Rustad, supra note 174, at 23, 80, 85, 87.
229. Under a no-fault scheme, a woman dissatisfied with her award will have even more litigation options than a consumer of a vaccine product that is dissatisfied with his or her award. This is because, under Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, comment k, strict liability claims against vaccine manufacturers are precluded. However, no such preclusion categorically applies to contraceptive products. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF contraceptives becomes reinvigorated as a result of the scheme. 232
D. MODIFICATIONS AND COMPLIMENTS TO A NCVIA-TYPE SYSTEM
As discussed in Section C., the NCVIA does not explicitly foreclose private actions against a vaccine manufacturer so long as the claimant has exhausted all his avenues through the Act. 233 The Act does, however, explicitly prohibit claimants from ever alleging failure to warn claims in the private suit. 234 In 2011, vaccine manufacturers were further insulated from private suits when the Supreme Court, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 235 held that claimants are also forever prohibited from bringing design defect claims against a manufacturer of a vaccine. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, was characteristic in his assault on state tort liability when he held that design defect claims are " [t] he most speculative and difficult type of products liability claim to litigate," 236 and leaving them available to plaintiffs would "hardly coax manufacturers back into the market." 237 In this respect, and in the face of the Supreme Court's long-held presumption against preemption, 238 the Supreme Court held almost all avenues of private redress against vaccine manufacturers as completely foreclosed. 239 The impact of the decision will have enormous rippling effects on product safety and claimant recovery for those injured for vaccine products. 240 Considering the recent decision in Bruesewitz, when drafting a no-fault act for contraceptives, Congress should be explicit and unambiguous in allowing design defect and failure to warn claims to proceed if a claimant has exhausted all remedies under the act. A no-fault system that shield contraceptive manufacturers from large-scale liability is necessary to reinvigorate the contraceptive market. However, this system should be carefully balanced against a claimant's ability to be made whole. 241 In the future, there will invariably be women severely injured from contraceptive products who cannot with precision prove placement on any pre-determined, injury/compensation table, and who require alternative, civil remedies. 242 As discussed in previous sections, wholesale preemption of any class of injury is an unnecessarily draconian approach that can cause manufacturers to purposely disregard information about deficiencies in their warnings or design. 243 In adopting a no-fault act for contraceptives, Congress should also be aware that drug manufacturers may not immediately be receptive to a decrease in liability, especially with a new tax imposed upon them by the no-fault act. 244 In the event that the market is not immediately responsive, Congress should consider adopting an Orphan Drug Act 245 -type of approach to complement the no-fault system, and to jump start investment by private manufacturers. 246 The Orphan Drug Act, passed in 1983, was created to attract manufacturers to design products for a market that would otherwise be too small to be profitably by giving them monopoly rights over the market. 247 The Act has proven successful in facilitating the research or development of drugs for rare diseases, such as ALS, Huntington's disease, and Myoclonus, manufacturers).
See Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and
Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853 REV. , 1856 REV. , 1902 REV. (1995 (Arguing that no-fault scheme generally serves its purpose, but must take into account policy considerations including product safety and ability of injured claimant to be made whole). which all affect small numbers of people residing in the United States. 248 Under an Orphan Drug Act approach, a limited number of contraceptive manufacturers could be given exclusive market control for a set period of time, contingent upon their development of new and cutting-edge contraceptive technologies. 249
VI. CONCLUSION
In the United States, there is an ongoing public health problem relating to unintended pregnancies. The unintended pregnancy rate is particularly concerning, given that childbirths that result from unintended or closely-spaced pregnancies are correlated with negative outcomes for the parent and child. While it is true that two-thirds of women in the United States are on some form of contraception, 250 almost half of all unintended pregnancies result from women who use their contraception inconsistently or incorrectly. 251 The most widely reported reason for contraceptive nonuse or gaps in use is dissatisfaction with available contraception methods and concerns about side effects of alternatives. 252 Despite the fact that women consistently express dissatisfaction with existing contraception methods, 253 the availability of the newer, safer, and more comfortable contraceptive methods remains stagnant. 254 The threat of excessive liability, as evidenced from the Dalkon Shield and Norplant litigation, 255 has caused contraceptive manufacturers to abandon the market in droves. 256 Only a few contraceptive manufacturers continue to invest in contraceptive research. 257 Over the past ten years, critics of liability have successfully advocated for judicially imposed federal preemption of drug and device claims as the primary vehicle to shield manufacturers from burdensome liability. 258 However, despite the data that suggests that manufacturers may respond positively to a decrease in potential liability, 259 federal preemption is an unnecessarily broad and radical approach to implications for those injured by medical and pharmaceutical products. 260 Lawmakers should be urged to investigate alternatives to the existing state law compensation schemes and wholesale preemption of contraceptive products. The most plausible alternative to the existing scheme is a no-fault compensation plan for those injured by contraceptive products. 261 Such a scheme could be modeled around the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which has proven to be successful at insulating manufacturers from volatile and unpredictable liability from defective products. Most importantly, a no-fault system based on the NCVIA might strike an ideal balance of contraceptive product safety and product innovation.
